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ABSTRACT 
This research has been performed to assess the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) and how much each donor is getting involved in Official Development Aid 
(ODA) contribution. My sources for data are the World Bank, FRED from St. Louis Fed and 
OECD databases. Using Excel statistical tools, I have got empirical ratios that show the level 
of MDG compliance. In addition, I estimate an econometric model to understand the 
determinants of ODA and obtain a measure of political will in each country.  
This study finds that most of OECD countries haven’t kept their aid promises. Their 
governments tend to prioritize other expenditures over ODA pledges. 
The report shows which countries have already reached the traditionally accepted 0,7%  target 
(ODA provided as percentage of GNI). I argue that most of them haven’t done so due to the 
lack of political will towards aid contribution. The results of the estimate model also indicate 
that neither the economic situation nor the political party in power have to do with the 
commitment default.  
Finally, I recommend an alternative design of ODA agenda along three guidelines. First, 
budget adjustments for the coming years in order to finance the aid gap. Second, ODA 
redefinition in order to avoid aid inflation. Third, require an ODA target in accordance with 
the economic situation of each country.  
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1. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
In 2000, with the beginning of the new millennium, the European Union gathered world 
leaders at the United Nations Millennium Summit with the aim of reducing global poverty and 
saving millions of lives. Leaders of 189 countries agreed on targeting eight goals to be achieved 
by 2015.  
1.1 Millennium Development Goals: description and achievements 
GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Target 1.A: “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is 
less than $1.25 a day” 
According to the World Bank data base, the amount of population living on less than $1.25 a 
day at 2005 international prices was already halved in 2010. There is no data for the world 
aggregate, but it can be approximated by evaluating the evolution of this variable either in 
developing countries by regions or in groups of countries according to their level of income.  
Despite the reduction of this indicator and the target achievement, 48% of the Sub-Saharan 
population is still living in extreme poverty, and only 14% of population has gone out of 
extreme poverty from 1990 until 2010.  
Table 1 Poverty headcount ratio by geographical regions 
 
As the income level analysis shows, the lower the level of income, the higher the amount of 
the population who live on less than $1.25 a day, and the lower the reduction of this amount. 
Therefore, low-income countries are diverging from high-income countries, what generates 
East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 56,24 35,58 12,48 -77,81%
Europe & Central Asia (developing only) 1,91 3,79 0,66 -65,45%
Middle East & North Africa (developing only) 5,75 5,01 2,41 -58,09%
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) 56,53 57,89 48,48 -14,24%
Latin America & Caribbean (developing only) 12,24 11,86 5,53 -54,82%
-54,08%
Table 1
Change1999
Average change
2010
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
(% of population) 1990
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greater gaps between living conditions in developed countries and those in developing 
countries.  
Table 2 Poverty headcount ratio by regions according to their income level 
Target 1.B: “Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
including women and young people” 
The amount of workers who lived below the $1.25-a-day poverty line have been considerably 
reduced, but there is still a lot of work to do until there is no worker underpaid. 
The gender gap in employment persists since 1990. The difference in percentage points 
between men and women in terms of the employment to population ratio by gender stays 
almost the same, since the decrease among the last two decades has been very tiny. In the case 
of the population in the range of age between 15 and 24, this gap has even increased a little bit. 
The proportion of world youth population (between 15 and 24) with a job has considerably 
decreased for both men and women, but the latter has decreased in a bigger proportion. 
Table 3 Gender gap in yung people employment rate 
 
Low income 64,94 62,91 48,25 -25,70%
Lower middle income 46,94 40,16 27,12 -42,22%
Low & middle income 43,05 34,07 20,6 -52,15%
Middle income 43,25 32,38 17,96 -58,47%
Upper middle income 39,89 24,88 8,39 -78,97%
-51,50%
Table 2
Change1990
Average change
1999 2010
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
(% of population)
World data 1991 2000 2012
Employment to population ratio, 15+, female (%) 48,67 48,45 47,30
Employment to population ratio, 15+, male (%) 75,57 73,90 72,43
Difference in percentage points between men and women (15+) 26,89 25,45 25,14
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, female (%) 44,45 38,43 34,17
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, male (%) 58,94 54,00 48,97
Difference in percentage points between men and women (15-24) 14,49 15,57 14,81
Table 3
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Target 1.C: “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger” 
This target has not still been met by 2012, and a big effort is required to achieve it by 2015. 
Still, in 2012 a 39.79% less of the world population were undernourished compared to 1990. 
The percentage of undernourished people in the world by 1990 was 22.88% while in 2012 was 
13.78%. There is a gap of 2.34% of the world population that must be helped to stop from 
suffering from hunger in the years left.  
Actually, the only world developing region where the target was met by 2012 is “East Asia & 
Pacific”. The smallest reduction of this indicator has taken place in “Sub-Saharan Africa”. This 
happens because it is the region with the highest initial rate of people suffering from hunger 
and therefore it required higher efforts to improve the situation. Still, it’s there where probably 
the biggest amount of people went out of hunger.  
It is remarkable that in “Middle East & North Africa” there were more people suffering from 
undernourishment in 2012 than in 1990. It is justified by the many wars and conflicts that have 
taken place in Middle East along these two decades: the continuous conflict between Israel and 
Palestine, the Afghanistan war (since 2001), the Lebanon war (2006), the Iraq war (2003-2011) 
and so on. 
 
Figure 1 Undernourished people by developing regions 
9 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
ch
ild
re
n
 u
n
d
e
r 
fi
ve
 
Year 
East Asia & Pacific (developing
only)
Europe & Central Asia
(developing only)
Middle East & North Africa
(developing only)
Latin America & Caribbean
(developing only)
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing
only)
Results are very similar when analysing the proportion of children under five that are 
malnourished. In 2012, a 39.32% less of the children aged five or less were suffering 
malnutrition in the world in comparison with 1990 data. However, there is an existing gap of 
2.66% of children under five who were still suffering malnutrition by 2012 and should be 
wiped away by 2015. 
In the developing countries of the regions “Europe & Central Asia”, “East Asia & Pacific” and 
“Latin America & Caribbean” the target of halving the proportion of malnourished children 
under five had already been met by 2000, 2005 and 2010 respectively. In developing countries 
of the “Middle East & North Africa” region the target is about to be met and in the countries 
of the “Sub-Saharan Africa” region efforts must be increased since the evolution of this 
indicator is the slowest one.  
GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Target 2.A: “Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be 
able to complete a full course of primary schooling” 
More kids than ever were completing its last year of primary school in the world by 2012. The 
biggest improvements in the primary completion rate occurred from 2000 on, being this one 
the date in which the Millennium Development Goals were targeted. The same happened with 
Figure 2 Malnourished children under five by developing regions 
10 
 
the primary school enrolment rate, which also increased in a higher proportion from 2000 on, 
as can be seen in table 4. 
Table 4 Primary schooling completion rate 
 
As table 5 shows, the literacy rate has increased for both men and women between 15 and 24, 
although in a higher proportion in the case of women. Thanks to this fact the gender gap in 
terms of literacy has been reduced by almost one half. 
 Table 5 Gender gap in literacy rate 
 
GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Target 3.A: “Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015” 
In 1990, for each 100 boys enrolled in primary and secondary education, only 86.37 girls were 
enrolled. This gender disparity has been considerably reduced in the last two decades. In 2012, 
for each 100 boys enrolled in primary and secondary education, 97.07 girls were enrolled. 
Hence, there is a little gap and gender disparity has not been fully eliminated. 
GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality 
Target 4.A: “Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate” 
The under-five mortality rate has been reduced by almost one halve and there is still a gap of a 
20% with respect to 1990 levels until the target is reached. 
World 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 Evolution
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 81,02 80,97 81,51 86,73 92,06 13,62%
School enrollment, primary (% net) 81,94 81,11 83,60 86,71 89,08 8,71%
Table 4
World 1990 2000 2010 Evolution
Literacy rate, youth male (% of males ages 15-24) 87,74 90,53 92,09 4,96%
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24) 78,57 84,04 86,93 10,63%
Gender gap 9,17 6,48 5,16 -43,69%
Table 5
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Table 6 Evolution of under-five mortality rate 
 
GOAL 5: Improve maternal health 
Target 5.A: “Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality 
ratio” 
Up to 2013 the maternal mortality ratio had dropped by 45% relative to the 1990-level. 
Despite this progress, accelerated interventions are required to achieve the target in 2015. 
One example of successful policy action is the one of South Asia, the region where the 
maternal mortality ratio has dropped by 65%. In addition, the number of births attended by 
skilled health staff has increased moderately worldwide. 
Target 5.B: “Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health” 
The adolescent fertility rate, which represents the number of births per 1,000 women aged 
between 15 and 19, has decreased by 30% from 1990 until 2012. 
Contraceptive prevalence rate has slightly increased globally by 9%. However, this ratio has 
increased in least developed countries by 82%, since the contraceptive use in 1990 was 
unusually low there. 
The number of pregnant women receiving prenatal care by skilled health personnel in 2009 is 
20% higher than in 2000. 
Although indicators show improvements in this area, ODA for reproductive health remains 
low. 
GOAL 6: Combat hiv/aids, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: “Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS” 
World 1990 2000 2012 Evolution Target Gap
Mortality rate, under-5 8,98% 7,54% 4,78% -46,77% -66,67% -19,90%
Table 6
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AIDS was hugely spread from 1990 to 2005; the amount of the world population who died 
because of AIDS was six times higher in 2005 than in 1990. The spread of AIDS was halted 
since 2006, when it began to reverse.  
As a dramatic consequence, the number of children orphaned because of parenthood loss due 
to AIDS before the age of 15 was eleven times higher in 2005 than in 1990 (when the epidemic 
began). 
Target 6.B: “Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those 
who need it” 
This target has not yet been achieved although improvements have been made. Still, a lot of 
people living with HIV are not receiving antiretroviral therapy. 
Target 6.C: “Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases” 
In the 80% of countries whose inhabitants suffered from malaria in 1998, the number of 
reported cases of malaria has been reduced considerably. In many countries the disease has 
even vanished. However, in the 20% of countries where malaria was present in 1998, the 
number of reported cases of malaria has increased. The worst case is the one of Mali, where 
the number of reported cases has multiplied by 71. Then, although great efforts have been 
made to halt the effects of malaria (e.g. extensive use of insecticide-treated bed nets), more 
emphasis is required in specific countries such as Mali. 
Tuberculosis treatment as well as tuberculosis detection rate have evolved positively during the 
last decades and therefore the tuberculosis death rate has dropped by 48%. 
GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Target 7.A: “Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies 
and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources” 
Forest area has dropped by 3% worldwide. CO2 emissions are 51% higher now than in 1990, 
due to the increase in global GDP, since CO2 emissions measured in terms of kg per PPP $ of 
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GDP have decreased by 51%. Still, CO2 emissions per capita have risen by 16% during the last 
decades. 
Target 7.B: “Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the 
rate of loss” 
In 2009, protected marine areas represented almost 10% of total surface area, whereas in 1991 
they were not even 5% of total surface area, what implies that the marine protected areas have 
doubled since then. 
Terrestrial protected areas were 14% of total surface area in 2012. It implies 70% more than in 
1990, when only 8% of total surface area was terrestrial protected area.  
Target 7.C: “Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” 
In 2012, a 16% more of population had access to improved sanitation facilities than in 1990, 
and a 13% more of population gained access to improved water source. However, the target is 
not fulfilled since the percentage of the population without access to safe drinking water and 
basic sanitation has not been halved.  
Target 7.D: “Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers” 
In 2009, a 30% less of urban population was living in slums compared to the levels of 1990. 
GOAL 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
Target 8.A: “Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system” 
The Official Development Assistance provided in 2012 amounted for more than $125 billion. 
The main donor was the USA, followed by United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. 
This was the top five of mayor donors in 2012 by countries. However, if we considered the 
European Union as a consolidated power it has been with a substantial difference the mayor 
14 
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donor during the last decades. In the graph number 3 is shown the ranking of mayor donors as 
well as its evolution since 1990. The other five countries that complete the top ten mayor 
donors in 2012 are Canada, Netherlands, Australia, Sweden and Norway respectively. 
Target 8.B: “Address the special needs of least developed countries” 
In 2012, 99% of goods (excluding arms) imported from least developed countries were 
admitted trades free of tariffs in the developed world.  
Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on textile products imported from least 
developed countries have dropped from 6% in 1996 to 3% in 2012. Those imposed on 
clothing products imported from least developed countries have been reduced from 11% in 
1996 to 6% in 2012, and those imposed on agricultural products have changed from 13% in 
1996 to 9% in 2012. 
Target 8.C: “Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and Small 
Island developing States” 
There is no information available about any indicator related with this goal. 
Target 8.D: “Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries” 
Figure 3 Total net ODA provided by the top five mayor donors  in 2012 during the last two decades 
in current US$ billion 
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In 2012, low-income countries repay 80% less of their debts than what they did in 1990. 
Target 8.E: “In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries” 
There is no information available about any indicator related with this goal. 
Target 8.F: “In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications” 
In 2013, 7 people from each 100 people in least developed countries were Internet users and 
55 people out of each 100 people were mobile cellular subscribers, whereas in 1990 nobody 
had access neither to the Internet nor to cellular lines in least developed countries. 
1.2 Millennium Development Goals: level of compliance 
Paying attention to the objectives included in each goal one by one, I have realized that only 
objectives 1A and 6A were fully accomplished by 2012. There were at least five objectives that 
had not been accomplished even by a 50% until 2012, being quite unlikely their fulfillment 
during the three years left until the established deadline.  
 
Access to reproductive health was still far from being universal by 2012 (G5B). In 2010, 
universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS was not achieved (G6B).  On the contrary, goals 
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Figure 4 MDGs' compliance rate by targets 
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GOAL SUCCESS RATE
GOAL 1 89,79%
GOAL 2 58,15%
GOAL 3 78,52%
GOAL 4 70,16%
GOAL 5 35,95%
GOAL 6 66,87%
GOAL 7 55,41%
GOAL 8 44,58%
Average 62,43%
in terms of poverty, hunger and illnesses are the ones achieved in a higher rate (Goals 1A, 1C, 
6A, 6C).  
On average, 60% of the ambitious global objective implied in 
the Millennium Development Goals was achieved by 2012. 
Although it represents a great effort, most probably the 
challenge won’t be accomplished by 2015 as it was promised 
in 2000. Those goals related to poverty, health and gender 
equality are the ones whose degree of compliance was above 
the average in 2012. 
2. EFFECTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MAIN DONNORS 
2.1 Global vision of the evolution of the representative indicators along the last 
couple of decades 
The countries that belong to the European Union provided more than half of global aid in 
2013 and therefore, it is the current principal world donor of development aid. The second 
position largest ODA donor is the US, and the one taking up the third position is Japan. 
Canada and Australia are in the fourth and fifth place, respectively.  
As there are not available data for the European Union as a whole in the World Bank database 
about the levels of ODA provided, and I would like to develop this study by using the same 
source of information with the aim of achieving a coherent conclusion, I have considered the 
countries of the European Union from which I have found available data: Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. They are only 19 of the 28 European Union member states, but I will add them up 
in order to find values for a representative cluster of the European Union as a unified ODA 
donor since its member states work together in this field.  
However, when analyzing ODA provided per each US$ of the country’s Gross National 
Income, the ranking of contributors turns upside down. GNI is the sum of value added by all 
resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of 
Table 7 MDGs' compliance 
rate by goals 
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output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) 
from abroad. In this case, it is Australia the country that provides a higher quantity of ODA 
per each dollar of its GNI, which is exactly the last country of the top five in terms of net 
ODA provided (in volume). With the exception of the European Union, the ranking is exactly 
turned upside down; that is, the higher the level of a country’s GNI the lower the proportion 
of GNI provided as ODA.   
For that reason it can be said that Europe is doing a great job since it has been the first or 
second power during the last decade when it comes to ODA provided per each dollar of its 
value added. However, it has committed to raise its ODA contribution up to 0.7% of its Gross 
National Income for 2015, which is in fact a too ambitious purpose. It is quite unlikely that 
this goal is achieved since in 2012 the European Union provided an ODA contribution of 
0.41% of its GNI. There was a 0.29% left in order to accomplish the promise that had to be 
achieved in no more than a couple of years. 
 
In terms of ODA provided per capita, the main donor in 2012 was Australia as well. This 
country provided approximately 238$ as ODA per each one of its inhabitants in 2012, while 
163$ of the money provided by each Canadian for public funds in 2012 were destined to 
Figure 5 Total ODA provided per each US$ of GNI by mayor donors during the last two decades  
expressed in % 
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Figure 6 Total ODA provided per capita by mayor donors during the last two decades expressed in 
current US$ 
ODA. Each European provided 152$ in 2012 as ODA, 98$ were given by each citizen of the 
United States and 83$ by each Japanese in 2012 as ODA.   
 
2.2 Analysis of the European Union contribution by Member States 
EU’s contribution to fighting poverty and inequality is extremely important for developing 
countries and poor communities across the world since it represents 53% of the global aid 
flows. Over the last decade, development aid managed by the European Commission has given 
more than 31 million people access to safe drinking water for the first time, has stopped 24 
million from going hungry, has given more than 9 million children access to primary education, 
has equipped 2.1 million rural people with modern energy services, has helped protect more 
than 1.5 million hectares of forest, has vaccinated more than 5 million children against measles 
and has provided anti-retroviral combination therapy for 750,000 people. 
In 2013, the EU spent €56.5 billion to help achieve the MDGs, but this is not enough in order 
to achieve the promise they have made. The European Union together with its member states 
promised that in 2015 their ODA countribution would be 0, 7% of GNI, but this is a very 
ambitious target compared to what has been given in the past.  
19 
 
As the MDG target is expiring soon, at the end of 2015, and the EU is the main ODA donor, 
it would be interesting to analyze how are doing the European member states in terms of 
ODA contributions.  
With the aim of simplifying the analysis I have divided the European Union member states 
into three groups depending on the volume of ODA that they provided in 2012. In the first 
group are included those member states that in 2012 provided less than $bn11 as ODA.  
After the year 2000, when the Millennium Development Goals were established in the United 
Nations Millennium Summit, the ODA contribution of the member states started to increase 
at a much more considerable rate than the one before the year 2000. However, this increase in 
the volume of ODA provided stopped or even turned into decrease in these countries from 
2008 on. There are three well defined phases in terms of ODA contribution: 1990-2000 
(before UN Millennium Summit), 2000-2008 (boom after UN Millennium Summit) and 2008-
2012 (economic crisis and consequent decrease of ODA contributions). 
With the purpose of examining the ODA individual contributions of the European Union 
Member States I classify them into three groups according to the volume of ODA they 
provided in 2012: less than $bn1, more than $bn1 but less than $bn6, and more than $bn1 but 
less than $bn15. 
                                                          
1
 one billion of US dollars according to short scale. Monetary units will be expressed in American billions in this 
paper ($bn1 = $1.000.000.000). 
Figure 7A Total net ODA provided by EU member states (<$bn1 in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ billion 
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Let’s start by analyzing the ODA contributions made by the countries that provided less than 
one billion of US dollars in 2012 (figure 7A). The most remarkable case is the one of Ireland 
and Greece, where the economic crisis that started in the year 2008 caused a huge decrease of 
the levels of ODA that they provided. In fact, the volume of ODA provided by both countries 
has not experienced any recovery during the Great Recession and has been reduced by 
approximately 40% in the case of England and by approximately 50% in the case of Greece. 
Another remarkable event is the sudden and sharp increase in Portugal’s ODA contribution in 
2003 (it almost tripled) as well as its sudden and sharp decrease in 2004 (until 2003 levels). 
However, Portugal and the rest of countries of this group were able to keep its ODA 
contribution constant during the crisis years. 
As can be seen in figure 7B, the radical change that took place in 2008 in the group of 
countries that provided more than one billion but less than six billions of US dollars was the 
one of Spain. Spain was in 2008 at the same level of ODA contribution than the Netherlands, 
which ends up being one of the countries that has fulfilled the 0.7% promise. If Spain had 
maintained its ODA provided 2008 levels during the crisis years it would be in the top 4 of EU 
member states donors. However, Spanish ODA contribution took just the opposite direction 
and was reduced by 70%, being its contribution in 2012 only two billions US dollars. Italian 
ODA contribution has also decreased by 40% during the recession. ODA contributions of 
Figure 7B Total net ODA provided by EU member states (<$bn6 in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ billion 
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Netherlands and Austria have decreased slightly while the rest of the countries have roughly 
kept or even increased (Sweden) their ODA contribution.  
As figure 7C shows, the top three of the EU member states in terms of ODA net contribution 
are France, Germany and United Kingdom. Their donations have evolved similarly from 2000 
until 2012. Still, in 2012 the main European net donor was the UK with an ODA contribution 
level of fourteen billion US dollars. The economic recession restrained this increasing trend 
and the amounts of aid slightly changed from previous levels, expect in the case of the UK. 
Although the UK is an EU member state that usually provides one of the highest net volume 
of ODA to developing countries, it is not at all in ODA per capita terms (figure 8). It is very 
important to consider the fact that a higher population brings higher aggregate GDP and GNI 
levels of the country and a higher net ODA contribution as well. Therefore, small countries 
like Luxembourg or with low population like Sweden and Norway are among the main donors 
of ODA per capita. These are the countries that will fulfill the 0.7% promise.  
 
 
 
Figure 7C Total net ODA provided by EU member states (<$bn15in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ billion 
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2.3 Which EU countries had kept the 0.7% promise up to 2013? 
At the tie of writing this paper, the Worldbank database provides data until 2013 (as it happens 
in the rest of databases that I have checked). Therefore I will take 2013 data as reference.  
The 0.7% ODA/GNI target was first agreed in 1970, and has been repeatedly re-endorsed at 
the highest level at international aid and development conferences. On the one hand, in 2005, 
the 15 countries that were members of the European Union by 2004 agreed to reach the target 
by 2015. On the other hand, the 0.7% target served as a reference for 2005 political 
commitments to increase ODA from the EU, the G8 Gleneagles Summit and the UN World 
Summit. 
As can be seen in figure 9, by 2013 only four European Union member states (from those 
being member states of the EU15 in 2004) would have reached the 0.7% target. The four EU 
member states that were doing well in the field of ODA contribution by the end of 2013 are 
Denmark (0.85%), Luxembourg (1%), Sweden (1.01%) and UK (0.71%). They would have 
kept their promise if they had maintained 2013 ODA contribution levels until 2015. 
Figure 8 Total ODA provided per capita by EU member states (>300$ in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ 
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Although the rich countries of the world had agreed to deliver 0.7% of GNI as development 
aid several years before, it was in 2005 when the EU and its members states agreed on a 
deadline of 2015 to reach this target. This is why I don’t mention Norway, the fifth European 
country that had kept the 0.7% promise by 2013 (1.07% by 2013). 
After an increasing trend from 2000 until 2009, during which the EU collective ODA had 
gradually risen, even the main donors have recently decreased their assistance. A representative 
example is the one of the Netherlands (0.67%), which stayed below the 0.7% target in 2013 for 
the first time since 1975. Other EU countries that provided more ODA as percentage of GNI 
in 2000 (when the MDGs were definite) than in 2013 (when the promise deadline was close) 
were Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain. In the last three countries it is a real problem since 
they were far from reaching the target even in 2000 and the gap is bigger now. On the 
contrary, UK incresed sharply its contribution from 2009 until 2013.  
In global terms, as of 2013 the EU had only provided 0.43% of its Gross National Income to 
aid, remaining a gap of 0.27% to achieve the collective target in 2015. I will analyze the aid gap 
and the degree of promise fulfillment later in this paper (section 4). 
3. ESTIMATION OF A STANDARD MODEL TO PREDICT ODA PROVIDED 
BY OECD MEMBERS  
3.1 Model context 
Figure 9 Net ODA provided as percentage of GNI by EU15 member states in 2000 and 2013 
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I have searched for independent variables that could explain the dependent variable “ODA 
provided as percentage of GNI” in a multiple regression model, that could be expressed in 
percentage points (to ensure a small residual) and that were not excessively correlated between 
them (to avoid the multicollinearity problem that would reduce the model reliability). Finally, I 
have selected four independent variables that correspond to four indicators of the economic 
situation of every country. In this way, it will be shown how rich countries decide their ODA 
contribution levels given the values their economic indicators take during each period of 
choice. After researching in different databases in order to find available data for sixteen 
sample countries, the last thirteen years and the four requested series, I have extracted the 
values of the dependent variable (“ODA provided as percent of GNI”) and one independent 
variable (“unemployment as percent of total labor force”) from the World Bank database (used 
to develop the first part of this paper) and the values of the other three independent variables 
(“real GDP growth”, “total current account balance as percent of GDP” and “cash 
surplus/deficit as percent of GDP”) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) 
database. The source of both databases is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), making the combination of data completely reliable.  
The sample period is 2001-2012. I decided to start in 2001 because as it has been shown in 
previous research, the ODA contributions started to increase from 2000 onwards, right after 
the MDGs were defined. I have considered as observations the averages of the three-year 
periods: 2001-2004, 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. Therefore sub index “t” can take these three 
values. 
I have selected a sample of sixteen OECD2 countries to develop this study: Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America. All of them are DAC3 members.  
                                                          
2
 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promotes policies that will improve 
the economic and social well-being of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which 
governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. 
3 The (Development Assistance Committee) DAC has the mandate to: promote development co-operation and 
other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty 
reduction, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and a future in which no country will depend 
on aid. With the revised System of National Accounts in 1993, gross national product was replaced by gross 
national income (GNI), an equivalent concept. DAC members’ performance against the 0.7% target is therefore 
now shown in terms of ODA/GNI ratios since 1993. 
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Attending to the four independent variables, “real GDP growth” is the economic growth 
indicator, “unemployment as percent of total labor force” is the unemployment indicator, 
“total current account balance as percent of GDP” is the trade balance and therefore 
commercial stability indicator and “cash surplus/deficit as percent of GDP” is the public 
finance balance indicator. 
3.2 OLS estimation of a multiple regression model 
3.2.1 Model description 
My purpose is to estimate a multiple regression model by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method. 
The linear relation to evaluate is: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where,  
𝐲𝐭 is the “Average ODA provided as percentage of GNI in the three-year period t”. It has 
been computed as the ratio of “Net ODA provided, total (current US$)” to “GNI (current 
US$)”. 
Net Official development assistance (ODA) comprises grants or loans to developing countries 
and territories on the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients that are undertaken by the official 
sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective and at 
concessional financial terms.  
GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product 
taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary 
income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year 
official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the 
rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor 
is used. Because development encompasses many factors - economic, environmental, cultural, 
educational, and institutional - no single measure gives a complete picture. However, the total 
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earnings of the residents of an economy, measured by its gross national income (GNI), is a 
good measure of its capacity to provide for the well-being of its people. 
𝐠𝐭 is the “Average growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product by expenditure in constant 
prices during the three-year period t”. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the economic activity, defined as the value of 
all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. 
The calculation of the annual growth rate of GDP volume is intended to allow comparisons of 
the dynamics of economic development both over time and between economies of different 
sizes. For measuring the growth rate of GDP in terms of volumes, the GDP at current prices 
are valued in the prices of the previous year and the thus computed volume changes are 
imposed on the level of a reference year; this is called a chain-linked series. Accordingly, price 
movements will not inflate nor deflate the growth rate. 
𝐧𝐱𝐭 is the “Average current account balance as a pertecentage of GDP during the three-year 
period t” 
The current account balance of payments is a record of a country's international transactions 
with the rest of the world. The current account includes all the transactions (other than those 
in financial items) that involve economic values and occur between resident and non-resident 
entities. Also covered are offsets to current economic values provided or acquired without a 
quid pro quo. This indicator is measured in million USD and percentage of GDP.  
𝐮𝐭 is the “Average unemployment rate as percentage of total labor force during the three-year 
period t” 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and 
seeking employment.  
𝐟𝐭 is the “Average cash surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP during the three-year period t” 
Cash surplus or deficit is the total public revenue (including grants) minus total public expense, 
minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. This cash surplus or deficit is close to the overall 
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government budget balance (still missing is lending minus repayments, which are now a 
financing item under net acquisition of financial assets).  
𝛆𝐭 is the error term of the OLS estimation that follows a normal distribution. 
3.2.2 Analysis of results: overall regression accuracy 
As the coefficient of determination (R2) shows, 52.55% of the variance experienced by the 
dependent variable (Average ODA provided as percentage of GNI in the three-year period t) 
is explained by the variance of the independent variables. Therefore, changes in a country’s 
economical situation explain only half of the changes in the level of ODA provided by that 
country. 
Table 8 Overall regression accuracy 
 
3.2.3 Analysis of results: probability that the regression output is not random (ANOVA) 
The probability that the regression output does not explain variations in 𝐲𝐭, i.e. that any fit is 
purely by chance is 0,00013%. This probability is very low and therefore the estimated 
correlation is meaningful. 
Table 9 Overall regression significance 
 
3.2.4 Analysis of results: reliability of the Y-intercept and Coefficients of the regression  
Estadísticas de la regresión
Coeficiente de correlación múltiple 0,72490726
Coeficiente de determinación R^2 52,55%
R^2  ajustado 0,48135012
Error típico 0,001835706
Observaciones 48
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA)
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 0,000160 0,000040       11,9049749 0,00013%
Residual 43 0,000145 0,000003       
Total 47 0,000305
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The predicted value of ODA provided would be: ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑔𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑛𝑥𝑡 + ?̂?3𝑢𝑡 + ?̂?4𝑑𝑡 
In order to find the OLS estimators ( ?̂?0, ?̂?1, ?̂?2, ?̂?3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̂?4 ) of the parameters 
(𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽4 ) I use the “Regression” Excel tool that applies the “LINEST” Excel 
function and obtain the following estimated model as a result. 
?̂?𝑡 = 0,0048 − 0,0754𝑔𝑡 + 0,0077𝑛𝑥𝑡 + 0,0027𝑢𝑡 + 0,0283𝑓𝑡 
Table 10 OLS estimates and its reliability 
 
Most or all P-values should be below 5%, however still two out of five are above 5%, being 
unemployment p-value highly above 5%. Let’s analyze OLS estimates (coefficients) 
individually: 
 ?̂?0 = 0,0048 
In case all the independent variables took zero value, the level of ODA provided as percentage 
of GNI would be this one. However, this hypothetical situation is very unlikely since 
unemployment rate will never take the zero value for structural reasons.  
The intercept coefficient is completely reliable, presents a 0% as p-value and therefore it is 
100% significant.  
?̂?1 = −0,0754  
In general terms, the higher the volume of GDP a country generates, the higher the level of 
ODA as percentage of GNI this country provides (a great economic situation encourages a 
country to commit more with developing countries and to follow a politically correct 
behavior). It also happens that when a country’s volume of GDP reaches high levels, it 
becomes really difficult for this variable to continue growing and GDP growth starts being 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0,0048 0,0010 4,8985 0,00% 0,0028 0,0068
Real GDP growth (%) -0,0754 0,0237 -3,1768 0,28% -0,1233 -0,0275
CA Balance (% GDP) 0,0077 0,0069 1,1279 26,56% -0,0061 0,0216
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 0,0027 0,0111 0,2422 80,98% -0,0196 0,0250
Cash surplus/deficit (% GDP) 0,0283 0,0078 3,6395 0,07% 0,0126 0,0439
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negative. That is, the higher the volume of GDP the lower the GDP growth ratio and vice 
versa.  
This coefficient is reliable at a very high rate since there is a probability of 0.28% that the 
coefficient of this variable has been obtained by chance.  
?̂?2 = 0,0077 
Logically, as long as the current account balance is positive the ODA contribution will 
increase. What is the same, if the economic transactions with the rest of the world give a 
positive result for the home country, the latter will be willing to provide higher volumes of 
ODA. Therefore, when referring to both variables as ratios to GDP and GNI respectively, the 
effect will be almost the same. 
However, this coefficient is not as reliable as it should since there is a probability of 26.56% 
that there is no significant relationship between 𝑛𝑥𝑡 and yt. Still, there is 73.44% of evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis (H0: β2 = 0) and keep this variable as significant since its sign 
follows the logic and doesn’t disturb the results. 
?̂?3 = 0,0027 
The expected estimated coefficient for this independent variable would have been negative and 
clearly different from zero. However, it is positive and relatively close to zero. This contra-
intuitive result is a consequence of the lack of reliability of this coefficient. There is a 
probability of 80.98% that there is no significant relationship between 𝑢𝑡  and yt . There is 
evidence to accept the null hypothesis this time (H0: β3 = 0). 
This effect is justified by the business cycle that happens in every economy and follows the 
pattern of expansion, peak, contraction and trough. In general terms, the business cycle is 
measured and tracked in terms of GDP and unemployment: GDP rises and unemployment 
shrinks during expansion phases, while the opposite happens in periods of recession. As a 
consequence, the independent variable GDP growth already demonstrates de business cycle 
effect in the model and the presence of unemployment diminishes the regression reliability. 
Therefore, I will delete ut and re-estimate the model without it. 
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?̂?4 = 0,0283 
In case the country’s budget presents a cash surplus, the country’s ODA contribution will 
increase. A cash surplus implies that the government’s finances have been run efficiently and 
that there is an excess budget after paying all the expenses the government has made. This 
excess budget can be used to increase the country’s ODA contribution. On the contrary, if a 
government’s budget presents a deficit, it must be financed by borrowing money. If there is 
lack of funds to cover public expenses, ODA contribution decreases. 
This coefficient is reliable at a very high rate since there is a probability of 0.07% that there is 
no significant relationship between 𝑓𝑡  and yt . There is enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis (H0: β4 = 0). 
3.3 OLS re-estimation of a multiple regression model 
3.3.1. Analysis of results: overall regression accuracy 
As the coefficient of determination (R2) shows, 52.48% of the variance experienced by the 
dependent variable (Average ODA provided as percentage of GNI in the three-year period t) 
is explained by the variance of the remaining three independent variables ( 𝑔𝑡, 𝑛𝑥𝑡 , 𝑓𝑡 ). 
Therefore, changes in a country’s economical situation explain only a little bit more than half 
of the changes in the level of ODA provided by that country. The reliability loss from 
dropping 𝑢𝑡 is very tiny (0.07%), avidencing the irrelevance of this variable in the model.  
Table 11 Overall regression accuracy 
 
3.3.2. Analysis of results: probability that the regression output is not random (ANOVA) 
Estadísticas de la regresión
Coeficiente de correlación múltiple 0,724460803
Coeficiente de determinación R^2 52,48%
R^2  ajustado 0,492446417
Error típico 0,001815963
Observaciones 48
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The probability that the regression output does not explain variations in 𝐲𝐭, i.e. that any fit is 
purely by chance, is 0,00003%. This probability is very low and therefore the estimated 
correlation is meaningful. As expected, this re-estimated model is more significant than the 
initial one (lower probability of default: 0,00003%< 0,00013%). 
Table 12 Overall regression significance 
 
3.3.3. Analysis of results: reliability of the Y-intercept and Coefficients of the regression  
The predicted value of ODA provided by the re-estimated model would be:  
?̂?𝑡 = 0,0050 − 0,0780𝑔𝑡 + 0,0071𝑛𝑥𝑡 + 0,0281𝑓𝑡 
Table 13 OLS estimates and its reliability 
 
The new model OLS estimates interpretation is exactly the same than for the previous trial. 
Now that I have a highly reliable model and coefficients, I will analyze the residuals for each 
observation. 
3.3.4. Analysis of results: interpretation of residuals (political will) 
As can be seen in table 15 (annexed), the level of ODA provided as percentage of GNI that 
the estimated model forecasted for Australia for the period 2009-2012 was the lowest one 
(0.18%). However, in that period Australia provided 0.17% additionally as a consequence of 
political will, providing in average 0.35% of GNI as ODA during those years. On the contrary, 
the level of ODA provided as percentage of GNI that the estimated model forecasted for 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA)
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0,0002      0,0001       16,2004        0,00003%
Residual 44 0,0001      0,0000       
Total 47 0,0003      
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0,0050 0,0004 12,3641 0,00% 0,0042 0,0058
Real GDP growth (%) -0,0780 0,0211 -3,7011 0,06% -0,1204 -0,0355
CA Balance (% GDP) 0,0071 0,0063 1,1304 26,44% -0,0056 0,0198
Cash surplus/deficit (% GDP) 0,0281 0,0077 3,6711 0,07% 0,0127 0,0436
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Norway for the period 2005-2008 was the highest one (1.07%). Nevertheless, in that period 
Norway provided in average 0.90% of GNI as ODA (shown in table 8 annexed), showing a 
negative political will this time (-0.17%).  
On the one hand, the biggest lack of political will to collaborate with developing countries 
between the selected countries and periods is registered in Italy during the periods 2001-2004 
and 2009-2012. According to the macroeconomic data of the country in that period the model 
estimates that 0.41% of GNI should have been provided as ODA but only 0.15% was 
provided, implying a political dislike of -0.25%. On the other hand, the higher level of political 
will in the ODA contributions of the selected countries during the selected years took place in 
Sweden during the period 2009-2012. According to the registered levels for the four 
macroeconomic independent variables Sweden should have provided 0.51% of GNI as ODA 
but this country provided 0.96% of GNI as ODA in that period, providing 0.45% of GNI as 
ODA because of political good will. 
Figure 10 illustrates the residuals for each observation, or what is the same the level of ODA 
as percentage of GNI that each country has provided above or below the one predicted by the 
estimated model. These values represent the positive or negative attitude each government has 
taken towards ODA contribution, constituting a measure of political will. 
Let’s start with a micro-level analysis (country by country).  
The Australian government has traditionally demonstrated a good will towards ODA 
contribution. However, there is a considerable difference between the three periods 
considered. From 1996 till the end of 2007 the Liberal Party was in power and the level of 
political good will is quite lower during the two first periods (0.03% and 0.04% respectively) 
than during the third one (0.17%), when the Labour Party governed. 
Something similar happens in the case of Belgium, the level of political will is very low or even 
negative during the liberal-socialist period (1999-2007) and considerably higher during the 
conservative period (2008-2011). 
As opposed to the Australian government, the Canadian government has traditionally shown 
political dislike towards ODA contribution (-0.12%, -0.06% and -0.03% respectively). Once 
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again, the liberal government (1994-2006) seems to be more unwilling to providing ODA to 
developing countries whereas the conservative government (2006-act) seems to be less 
reluctant. 
Figure 10 ODA provided as political will by countries and periods 
 
Denmark represents the exception of what empirical data shows up to now. The Dane 
government has traditionally demonstrated the highest or one of the highest levels of good will 
towards ODA contribution being liberal during the three periods (2001-2011). The only 
country that has exceeded the Danish level of political good will in terms of ODA 
contributions is Sweden during the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. 
The French government has been managed by a conservative party during the whole period 
and the levels of ODA they have provided as political will have been quite close to zero until 
2008. In the last period this level has increased considerably up to 0.15%.  
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In Germany, the centre-left was in power until 2005 and the centre-right from then on. The 
political change (2005-2008) meant a neutral political will towards ODA contribution. 
However, during the previous period the centre-left party seemed to be reluctant to provide 
high ODA levels since its political ill-will was quite high (-0.15%) and during the next period 
centre-right party started to apply its characteristic austerity policy that signified returning to 
political ill-will towards ODA contribution (-0.10%). 
Italy is just the opposite case than Denmark and Sweden. Not only has its government 
(independent of which party was in power) traditionally shown political reluctance but also has 
it been the most resistant government to ODA contribution during the three periods (-0.25%, 
-0.20% and -0.25% respectively). 
The Japanese government has traditionally shown political dislike towards ODA contribution 
as well (-0.07%, -0.15% and -0.11% respectively). There is no logical reasoning to difference 
between ideologies this time.  
The same happens in Korea, it is one of the most reluctant governments towards ODA 
contribution independently of the period (-0.13%, -0.14% and -0.19% respectively). Once 
again there is no logical reasoning to conclude about ideological relationships with political will 
about ODA. 
Despite the fact that Norway is the country that has contributed in the highest scale during the 
three periods to ODA, the average Norwegian political will results negative for the whole 
period (0.00%, -0.17% and 0.05% respectively). This implies that Norway is a great donor 
because its economy is powerful enough to be so, not because of its political good will. It is a 
matter of the country not of the political party in power since it doesn’t exist any logical 
relationship between the volume of ODA provided as political will and the political force 
governing the country. During 2001-2004 a centre-right party was in power and its political will 
was non-existent. From 2005 on the centre-left has been in power and the country’s political 
will has dramatically changed.  
Up to 2008 the political will of Portugal was approximately neutral (0.02% and -0.01% 
respectively) but from 2008 on it turned into political reluctance (-0.10%). Once again there is 
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no relationship between political will and ideology in power. The first period coincides with a 
centre-right party in power, the second one with a centre-left party in power and the third one 
with both political sides. There is no reason to blame ideology of the differences in political 
will towards ODA contribution in this case. 
The case of Spain is quite unusual since radical changes in the estimated political will are 
observed. From 2001 to 2004, with the centre-right party in power political will was non-
existent (0.02%). From 2005 to 2008 the estimated ODA contribution as percentage of GNI 
provided as political good will increased considerably (0.12%). From 2008 to 2012 both parties 
alternated in power and the political will towards ODA contribution decreased sharply (-
0.09%). My guess is that this radical change took place because of the state cutbacks typical of 
the austerity program following the 2008-2009 recession in Europe. It also may be influenced 
by the huge increase in the unemployment rate, which may have overvalued the forecasted 
ODA contribution for this period.  
The Swedish government has traditionally demonstrated the highest or the second highest 
level of good will towards ODA contribution being leftist until 2006 and conservative from 
2006 on. This makes evident the fact that its high political will towards ODA contribution is a 
matter of national awareness rather than political tendency. The only country that has 
exceeded the Swedish level of political good will in terms of ODA contributions is Denmark 
during the period 2001-2004. 
The Swiss government has traditionally been considerably reluctant towards ODA 
contribution according to estimations (-0.20%, -0.14% and -0.14% respectively). It seems to be 
a matter of national lack of awareness rather than ideological trends. 
The British government has also demonstrated during the whole period its political good will 
towards ODA contributions. This awareness with aiding developing countries has growth 
exponentially in United Kingdom (0.11%, 0.17% and 0.26% respectively). Once more my 
guess is that it is not a matter of ideology (leftist in power from 1997 until 2010; conservative 
in power from 2010 on) but a matter of awareness. More concretely, in UK there is a 
membership body for organizations working in international development (Bond) whose key 
priority is to ensure that the UK government fulfils its promises on the quantity and quality of 
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aid, and achieves the UN aid target of 0.7% of gross national income. Actually, Bond and the 
member organisations have been campaigning to reach this target. 
The American government has usually shown reluctant to provide ODA during the right-
winger periods (2001-2004: -0.21%; 2005-2008: -0.17%) whereas the average political 
reluctance during Obama’s period has disappeared (2008-2012: 0.00%). 
With regard to the macro-level analysis, the average residual for each period has progressively 
followed an upward trend. From 2001 to 2004, in average, the governments of the sample 
countries have been slightly reluctant to ODA contribution (-0.03% of GNI). During the 
period 2005-2008 aversion to ODA contribution almost disappeared in general terms (-0.01% 
of GNI). In the most recent period the trend has been political good will towards ODA 
contributions (0.04% of GNI). 
It would be of common sense that the European Union member states contained in the 
sample were the ones that had followed this upward trend in terms of political will in order to 
keep the 0.7% promise by 2015. Unfortunately, due to the economic recession and the 
consequent economic policy of cutbacks imposed in some EU countries, this did not happen. 
The knowledge acquired in Macroeconomics, Applied Economics and Econometrics has been 
crucial to carry out this study.  
3.4. Aid involvement ranking 
By averaging the data of each country for the three periods I get a ranking that classifies the 
studied countries according to their ODA contributions during the last twelve years. 
3.4.1. Ranking in terms of effective economically-consistent ODA 
This ranking is shown in table 16 (annexed). In average, only three of the sample countries 
have overcome the 0.7% target of ODA provided as a percentage of GNI. They are Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark. Four out of the five “top-five ODA donors” are also in the “top-five” 
of countries involved politically: Denmark, Sweden, UK and Belgium. The controversial issue 
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is the fact that Norway is the average top aid donor but presents a negative political will in 
average, staying in the ninth position in terms of ODA provided as political will.  
3.4.2. Ranking in terms of effective politically-committed ODA 
In the ranking shown in table 17 (annexed), can be seen that the UK joins to the top-three of 
ODA donnors as a consequence of political will together with Denmark and Sweden. Norway 
is a great donor only because its economic conditions are favourable to be so, since its average 
amount of ODA provided as political will is negative (-0.04%). 
The four countries that provide the lowest volumes of ODA as percentage of GNI are Japan, 
the US, Italy and Korea, resulting with significant difference the Korean one the lowest 
contribution. These four countries belong to the bottom-five ODA donnors as a consequence 
of political will. Another remarkable case is the one of Switzerland, that provides the second 
lowest political will level together with Korea. If Switzerland provided 0.16% of ODA as a 
percentage of GNI as a consequence of political good will instead of providing 0.16% of GNI 
less than what this country can afford, it would reach the 0.7% target.  
3.5 Predictions based on the estimated model  
The estimated model together with the forecasted values for its independent variables 
(available in OECD database) can be useful to estimate economically-consistent ODA 
provided as percentage of GNI during 2016 by the sixteen DAC countries. 
The forecasted ODA contributions for 2016 are shown in table 18 (annexed). 
According to this estimation, none of the nine EU15 countries included in the DAC sample 
would make the 0.7% promise considering its economically consistent ODA contributions. 
And only Norway from the whole sample would meet the target thanks to its economic 
conditions. 
Therefore, the pledge fulfillment depends on the political will of each country towards aid 
contribution.   
4. PLEDGE FULFILLMENT AND AID GAP 
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4.1 Current scenario 
EU15’s aid commitment has been under threat since 2010 due to the lack of progress in aid 
levels. As can be seen in Figure 11, the ratio of ODA as a percentage of GNI provided by 
EU15 countries in 2012 (0.40%) was lower level than in 2005 (0.41%), the moment in which 
countries committed to spend 0.7% of their GNI on aid by 2015. From 2012 onwards, it 
seems that ODA contributions have increased towards the objective but still there has been a 
considerable aid gap during the whole decade. Finally, as expected, the promise has not been 
met by 2015, in general terms there is an ODA gap of 0.25% of GNI to meet the promise. 
As aid commitments are expressed as a percentage of GNI, the volume of ODA required by 
each EU member state in order to reach the target is closely linked to the size of its economy. 
A great example is the one of Germany and France, the two largest EU economies, which 
account for a significant proportion of the overall aid flows. They are, respectively, the second 
and third biggest aid donors in absolute terms, right after the UK. However, although they are 
not the worst performers in relative terms, they are in the top four of EU members generating 
the aid gap.  
As figure 12 shows, only four EU15 member states are responsible for approximately 80% of 
the total aid gap in 2015; while the remaining eleven EU15 member states are responsible for 
the other 20% of aid gap in the deadline year. The four countries that mainly contribute to 
Figure 11 Aid gap as % of GNI for a representaive cluster of EU member states from 2005 to 2015 
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France 
17% 
Germany 
23% 
Italy 
25% 
Spain 
16% 
The rest 
19% 
generate the aid funding gap are Italy (25% of the total gap), Germany (23%), France (17%) 
and Spain (16%).  
As evidence shows, Germany and 
France do not contribute to 
development aid in correlation with the 
size of their economies and therefore, 
they are still far from fulfilling the 0.7% 
of GNI target. Once again, this is due 
to the scarce political good will in the 
case of France and the reluctance of 
the German government towards 
ODA contribution (see residuals in 
2015 in annexed table 15). 
Italy and Spain are also sizable 
economies that have cut their aid levels sharply and provide now the lowest levels of ODA as 
a percentage of GNI of the EU15 (Italy assigns 0.16% of its GNI for aid, while Spain assigns 
0.17% of its GNI).  Once again this is not an issue of financial crisis; it is an issue of lack of 
political will (shown in Table 15) since both economies have provided less percentage of their 
GNI as ODA in 2015 than what their economic circunstances estimated they should have 
provided (negative residuals, political reluctance).  
Despite the fact that the EU institutions and its member states provide more than half of 
global Official Development Assistance to help achieve the MDGs, this is not enough. The 0, 
7% program is a very ambitious target compared to what has been provided in the past, but it 
is a ridiculous goal if you compare it to the total level of public expenditure of many national 
governments or with the money that governments have invested in bailing out the European 
banks. In fact, people in Europe spend more on lottery than what they spend on global aid, 
which is approximately 30€ per person per year. 
In addition, the promise has definitely not been kept and EU’s credibility has been damaged. 
Aid is not regarded as charity in the EU. It is more about an obligation and justice. EU 
Figure 12 Distribution of the aid gap as percentage of GNI 
in 2015 
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countries were the ones that set the target and therefore they are morally bound since 
developing countries are still counting on such commitment.  
4.2 Potential solutions (post-2015) 
Actually, the EU could have met the target and overcome the existing aid gap in the year 2015 
with the coordinated effort of member states. The EU can find sufficient resources as long as 
there is enough political will. In fact, European budgets offer some flexibility from a financial 
perspective. The EU spends billions of Euros every year on subsidies that are hardly 
compatible with long term sustainable economic growth (the total aid gap is significantly 
smaller). The EU also devotes a significant amount of money to national defense budget, most 
of which is spent on weapons. But these quantities are insignificant when compared to the 
€700 billion assigned to EU’s financial stability mechanisms created during the banking crisis 
destined mainly to bail out banks in trouble. Only 5.51% of that money would have been 
enough to fill the collective ODA of EU institutions and 28 member states, which amounts for 
€38.582 billion. 
I find two post-2015 potential solutions once last years mistakes have been identified. 
On the one hand, the EU could plan some budget adjustments for the following five years, 
which could be enough time to reallocate the existing burget. In this way, aid could be linearly 
increased in order to meet the 0.7% target by 2020.  
On the other hand, the EU could increase aid by adding the €38.582 billion in 2016 to the 
projected aid level in a one-year step and postpone the target compliance one year. However, it 
is very difficult to ensure that such a large and sudden increase in aid flows in a single year is 
adequately managed. 
At the political level, the EU and its member states would have to design a strategy for 
increasing aid levels accordingly, and coordinate its implementation, as the Lisbon Treaty 
states. The EU should also ensure that the distribution of new aid flows is equitable and has 
maximum impact on development, fostering human rights and fighting inequality. To do this, 
the EU should start by selecting recipient countries on the basis of their development needs 
rather than on its political and economic interests. One more step forward to achieve equality 
41 
 
is to implement the aid and development effectiveness by improving in terms of coordination, 
harmonization and transparency, which are key principles in this field.  
Moreover, the ODA contribution target should be fixed according to the economic power of 
each country. It is not reasonable that a powerful economy such as the French one has the 
same proportional target (0.7% of GNI) than a poorer country like Greece. In fact, the most 
economically powerful committed countries have already increased their ODA contribution 
targets to 1% of GNI (e.g. Denmark, Luxemburg, Sweden, Norway) whereas the economically 
powerless countries have fixed a lower but attainable target: 0.33% of GNI (e.g. Hungary, 
Poland, Croatia). Then, it doesn’t make sense to establish a global and unique goal since 
economic conditions differ from country to country. For powerful countries it won’t imply a 
big effort to attain the 0.7% target whereas for powerless countries it will be completely 
unattainable. In this way, it is useless to fix a common goal since it can be known from the 
beginning which countries will reach it and which ones won’t. 
Additionally to these potential solutions, other measures should be implemented after 2015 in 
order to define ODA porperly and increase the development awareness of the European 
population. 
EU member states must redefine ODA and play by the rules of the game. Given the pressure 
to deliver on its commitments, the EU might be tempted to report an inflated amount of aid as 
part of its official ODA figures or to request a revision of the existing definition of ODA so 
that emerging types of flows (such as climate finance or support for private sector 
development) can be reported as aid. However, only real aid will maximize the long-term 
impact on developing countries, those living in poverty, and ultimately the European citizens. 
Trying to meet the target by cheating would be self-defeating in the long term and the need for 
aid would continue. 
In order to avoid these aid inflations the ODA definition should be reviewed, since it includes 
some expenditures that do not involve a real transfer of resources to developing countries, 
such as student and refugee costs in developed countries, debt relief, tied aid and interest on 
loans. 
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First, funds provided as climate finance, shouldn’t be counted as ODA for a more precise and 
real aid measurement. On the contrary, the EU should agree on a joint definition of climate 
finance that classifies it as additional to the 0.7% pledge.  
Second, ODA funds shouldn’t be used to support the private sector through blending 
mechanisms, public-private partnerships (PPPs) or catalytic finance such as guarantees, equity 
investments, and loans. There is no clear evidence of the contribution these types of flows 
make to development or poverty eradication. Actually, they seem to be better at supporting 
companies from developed and emerging economies than low-income countries and poor 
communities. 
Third, a very limited amount of expenditure on peace and military operations is reportable as 
ODA. The most common situation in which these expenses could be reported as ODA is 
when using the military to deliver humanitarian assistance in the event of a natural disaster. 
Including military costs would simply inflate aid figures disproportionately in a number of 
countries, while wars worsen poverty and development. Therefore, the ODA definition should 
not be broadened in this direction. 
Another relevant issue is the population awareness of the political commitments made by the 
public sector and how these are allocated in the budget. In order to have a general idea of what 
do Europeans think about helping developing countries and whether they have ever heard 
about MDGs I have checked a survey that has been requested by the European Commission: 
“Special Eurobarometer”. 
Regarding the feedback provided by “Special Eurobarometer” some measures should be 
introduced in this field as well.  
First, more information about MDGs and aid promises should be distributed since only 12% 
of the Europeans correctly estimate the amount of global population that live in extreme 
poverty and only 6% of Europeans have heard of or read about the Millennium Development 
Goals and know what they are. A wider advertising campaign about MDGs and collaboration 
with developing countries should be distributed and the government should inform about its 
aid commitments with a certain frequency on the media. 
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Second, people should be aware of the fact that the aid gap represents only a small proportion 
of other huge public expenditures that don’t generate any future value. The mainstream view in 
Europe is that we should keep our promise to increase aid to developing countries despite the 
current difficult economic situation. But still, 16% of respondents think that aid should not be 
increased even though it has been promised and 18% of respondents think that it should be 
reduced because we can no longer afford it. European population should know that tackling 
poverty in developing countries has a positive influence on EU citizens as well. 
Third, a different way of providing aid could be paying more for products from developing 
countries to support people living there. A third of respondents say they would be ready to pay 
up to 5% more, while a tenth of respondents would be ready to pay between 6% and 10% 
more. Just 4% would be ready to pay over 10% more. In general, people who are prepared to 
pay more for products from developing countries think that tackling poverty in developing 
countries has a positive influence on EU citizens as well.  
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CONCLUSION 
Developed world often sets too ambitious goals with the aim of helping the developing world. 
There is a trend consistent on making well-sounded promises with a pre-established deadline 
that are frequently not kept on time (e.g. 62.43% of the MDG commitment had been 
accomplished by 2012). 
In general, the main donors are highly politically involved (Denmark, Sweden, UK and 
Belgium from my sample countries) and countries that provide the lowest volumes of ODA 
are the ones less politically involved (Japan, US, Italy and Korea from my sample countries). 
The great exceptions are Norway and Switzerland, that being powerful economies are in 
average politically reluctant towards aid (especially Switzerland).  
There are three main reasons for such commitment breach. First, governments of rich 
countries are reluctant to raise the level of aid they provide. On the contrary, they prefer 
rescuing banks for a much higher value before keeping their word with the developing world. 
Second, there is a lack of political and social awareness about how much we can help them and 
how important can be their growth for us. Last but not least, objectives are fixed in the very 
long term. 
From my point of view, governments should stop from excusing themselves with the 
economic crisis and fill their promises since aid levels don’t make the difference in their 
budgets. In order to achieve the established objectives on time they should previously fix 
intermediate milestones because it is easier to meet smaller objectives in a shorter time and 
progressively rather than meet a very ambitious target in the last years as they often pretend to 
do.    
Political good will, the establishment of more realistic goals and truth commitment are crucial 
elements for a successful assistance program on developing countries. 
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Figure 13 Total ODA provided per capita by EU member states (<100$ in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ 
Figure 14 Total ODA provided per capita by EU member states (<300$ in 2012) during the last two 
decades expressed in current US$ 
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Dependent variable
ODA provided  (% 
GNI)
Real GDP 
growth (%)
CA Balance (% 
GDP)
Unemployment
, total (% of 
total labor 
force)
Cash 
surplus/deficit 
(% GDP)
2001-2004 0,25% 3,39% -4,34% 6,13% 0,52%
2005-2008 0,29% 3,24% -5,83% 4,60% 1,63%
2009-2012 0,35% 2,56% -3,76% 5,27% -3,30%
2001-2004 0,43% 0,41% 3,54% 7,57% -0,08%
2005-2008 0,46% 0,36% 1,16% 7,77% -1,08%
2009-2012 0,53% 0,22% -0,54% 7,70% -3,71%
2001-2004 0,25% 2,39% 1,81% 7,42% 1,47%
2005-2008 0,30% 2,24% 1,02% 6,27% 1,18%
2009-2012 0,31% 1,39% -3,15% 7,73% -1,06%
2001-2004 0,89% 1,08% 2,67% 4,92% 0,72%
2005-2008 0,79% 1,59% 2,73% 3,98% 4,78%
2009-2012 0,85% -0,74% 5,05% 7,15% -2,58%
2001-2004 0,36% 0,39% 1,04% 8,78% -3,08%
2005-2008 0,41% 0,26% -0,92% 8,27% -2,47%
2009-2012 0,46% 0,18% -1,61% 9,38% -5,87%
2001-2004 0,26% 0,54% 2,05% 9,00% -1,98%
2005-2008 0,35% 2,18% 6,00% 9,38% -1,05%
2009-2012 0,36% 0,61% 6,42% 6,52% -1,38%
2001-2004 0,15% 0,15% -0,74% 8,90% -2,68%
2005-2008 0,21% 0,04% -2,30% 6,82% -2,36%
2009-2012 0,15% -0,27% -2,06% 8,82% -3,73%
2001-2004 0,21% 1,17% 2,94% 5,07% -5,31%
2005-2008 0,22% 1,04% 3,94% 4,10% -2,58%
2009-2012 0,18% 0,11% 2,42% 4,70% -7,63%
2001-2004 0,05% 4,95% 2,36% 3,65% 1,93%
2005-2008 0,07% 4,35% 1,48% 3,38% 1,41%
2009-2012 0,11% 3,29% 3,00% 3,48% 1,20%
2001-2004 0,85% 0,53% 13,12% 4,03% 10,81%
2005-2008 0,90% 0,51% 15,05% 3,27% 17,84%
2009-2012 1,00% 0,17% 12,71% 3,32% 13,15%
2001-2004 0,30% 0,90% -8,20% 5,50% -3,05%
2005-2008 0,21% 1,25% -10,57% 7,72% -3,68%
2009-2012 0,27% -1,56% -7,35% 12,15% -7,08%
2001-2004 0,24% 3,31% -3,90% 11,25% 0,19%
2005-2008 0,34% 3,20% -8,76% 9,45% 1,04%
2009-2012 0,33% -1,57% -3,46% 21,30% -6,40%
2001-2004 0,72% 0,63% 5,52% 5,73% 0,10%
2005-2008 0,88% 0,38% 8,03% 6,85% 2,21%
2009-2012 0,96% 0,38% 5,88% 8,25% -0,21%
2001-2004 0,33% 0,22% 10,10% 3,45% -0,64%
2005-2008 0,38% 0,73% 9,17% 3,85% 0,36%
2009-2012 0,42% 0,35% 10,35% 4,20% 0,27%
2001-2004 0,31% 2,97% -1,94% 4,90% -1,89%
2005-2008 0,41% 2,02% -1,88% 5,28% -3,13%
2009-2012 0,52% -0,02% -2,23% 7,88% -8,13%
2001-2004 0,13% 0,60% -4,38% 5,60% -2,73%
2005-2008 0,18% 0,28% -5,24% 5,12% -3,27%
2009-2012 0,20% 0,36% -2,83% 9,07% -9,26%
16            
US
TOTAL: 48 observations 
(average for the period)
Independent variables
7            
Italy
8                 
Japan
9                 
Korea
10             
Norway
11               
Portugal
12       
Spain
1       
Australia
2       
Belgium
3         
Canada
4        
Denmark
5          
France
6           
Germany
Table 8
13   
Sweden
14 
Switzerland
15             
UK
Table 14 Observations used to estimate the regression 
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Country Observation Forecast ODA provided  (% GNI) Residual = Political will
2001-2004 0,22% 0,03%
2005-2008 0,25% 0,04%
2009-2012 0,18% 0,17%
2001-2004 0,49% -0,06%
2005-2008 0,45% 0,01%
2009-2012 0,38% 0,16%
2001-2004 0,37% -0,12%
2005-2008 0,37% -0,06%
2009-2012 0,34% -0,03%
2001-2004 0,46% 0,43%
2005-2008 0,53% 0,26%
2009-2012 0,52% 0,33%
2001-2004 0,39% -0,03%
2005-2008 0,40% 0,00%
2009-2012 0,31% 0,15%
2001-2004 0,42% -0,15%
2005-2008 0,34% 0,01%
2009-2012 0,46% -0,10%
2001-2004 0,41% -0,25%
2005-2008 0,41% -0,20%
2009-2012 0,40% -0,25%
2001-2004 0,28% -0,07%
2005-2008 0,38% -0,15%
2009-2012 0,29% -0,11%
2001-2004 0,19% -0,13%
2005-2008 0,21% -0,14%
2009-2012 0,30% -0,19%
2001-2004 0,86% 0,00%
2005-2008 1,07% -0,17%
2009-2012 0,95% 0,05%
2001-2004 0,29% 0,02%
2005-2008 0,22% -0,01%
2009-2012 0,37% -0,10%
2001-2004 0,22% 0,02%
2005-2008 0,22% 0,12%
2009-2012 0,42% -0,09%
2001-2004 0,49% 0,23%
2005-2008 0,59% 0,29%
2009-2012 0,51% 0,45%
2001-2004 0,54% -0,20%
2005-2008 0,52% -0,14%
2009-2012 0,55% -0,14%
2001-2004 0,20% 0,11%
2005-2008 0,24% 0,17%
2009-2012 0,26% 0,26%
2001-2004 0,35% -0,21%
2005-2008 0,35% -0,17%
2009-2012 0,19% 0,00%
Table 9
6 Germany
7 Italy
8 Japan
1 Australia
2 Belgium
3 Canada
4 Denmark
5 France
15 UK
16 US
9 Korea
10 Norway
11 Portugal
12 Spain
13 Sweden
14 Switzerland
Table 15 Forecasts and residuals for each observation 
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Position Country
Average ODA provided as political will 
(% GNI) ranked from highest to lowest
1 Denmark 0,34%
2 Sweden 0,32%
3 UK 0,18%
4 Australia 0,08%
5 Belgium 0,04%
6 France 0,04%
7 Spain 0,02%
8 Portugal -0,03%
9 Norway -0,04%
10 Canada -0,07%
11 Germany -0,08%
12 Japan -0,11%
13 US -0,13%
14 Switzerland -0,16%
15 Korea -0,16%
16 Italy -0,24%
Position Country
Average ODA provided (% GNI) 
ranked from highest to lowest
1 Norway 0,92%
2 Sweden 0,85%
3 Denmark 0,84%
4 Belgium 0,47%
5 UK 0,41%
6 France 0,41%
7 Switzerland 0,38%
8 Germany 0,33%
9 Australia 0,30%
10 Spain 0,30%
11 Canada 0,29%
12 Portugal 0,26%
13 Japan 0,21%
14 US 0,17%
15 Italy 0,17%
16 Korea 0,08%
Table 16 Ranking of countries according to the average ODA provided as a percentage of GNI from 2001 
to 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 Ranking of countries according to the average ODA provided as political will as a percentage of 
GNI from 2001 to 2012 
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Table 18 Estimated ODA contributions for 2016 
 
Dependent variable
Estimated ODA provided 
for 2016 (% GNI)
Real GDP 
growth (%)
CA Balance (% 
GDP)
Cash surplus/ 
deficit (% 
GDP)
1 Australia 0,22% 2,88% -2,52% -1,40%
2 Belgium 0,35% 1,81% 2,73% -1,20%
3 Canada 0,27% 2,26% -3,15% -1,20%
4 Denmark 0,29% 2,30% 7,21% -3,00%
5 France 0,28% 1,65% -0,27% -3,10%
6 Germany 0,38% 2,32% 8,29% 0,20%
7 Italy 0,35% 1,51% 3,43% -2,10%
8 Japan 0,22% 1,40% 3,03% -6,70%
9 Korea 0,28% 3,64% 6,64% 0,50%
10 Norway 0,72% 1,50% 6,93% 10,20%
11 Portugal 0,30% 1,79% 0,57% -2,40%
12 Spain 0,16% 2,84% 1,30% -4,50%
13 Sweden 0,29% 3,03% 6,35% -0,80%
14 Switzerland 0,45% 1,68% 10,49% 0,30%
15 UK 0,17% 2,34% -4,45% -4,10%
16 US 0,13% 2,76% -2,96% -4,60%
Country
Independent variables (2016 forecast)
